

VIETNAM COURIER

Jan. 19
1970

No. 252

7th Year

Information Weekly — E.O. : 46 Trun Hung Dao Street, Hanoi — Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

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Nixon's "Vietnamization" POLICY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE

IN his program-speech of Nov. 3, 1969, President Nixon defined his Viet Nam policy as follows: "We can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization." He stressed that that plan "will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front."

Thus, the keystone of his policy is "Vietnamization" of what he calls the "search for peace."

COROLLARY OF NIXON'S DOCTRINE

ACCORDING to Mr. Nixon, the "Vietnamization" policy stems from his "new" global strategy, from that famous "Nixonian doctrine" regarding Asia, which can be put in a nutshell as follows:

1.—"The United States will keep all its treaty commitments." In other words it means to pursue its search for world hegemony, maintain its positions everywhere, and prop up US-paid neo-colonialist regimes.

2.—"We (the US) shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom

of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security". This is the usual nuclear blackmail aimed at bullying the national liberation movements, alleged to be loyal to a foreign "nuclear power."

3.—"In cases involving other types of aggression, we (the US) shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence." This is the confirmation of the resolve of the US not to give up its role as international gendarme ready to crush all uprising attempts labelled "aggression", for the sake of repression. The difference is the nationality of the men who are to use the weapons: formerly, these were the American forces, "special" and other, now, to prevent "future Viet Nam", the Nixon administration which is aware of the limits of US power, would rather set natives against natives and Asians against Asians.

Applied to Viet Nam, the "Nixonian doctrine" is named "Vietnamization." This means first that Nixon's

Viet Nam policy does not relinquish any of its objectives. The US intends to continue its neo-colonial domination in South Viet Nam, shore up the puppet regime, perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam. To attain these goals, the task now is incumbent on the quislings who, on orders from the Americans and with the material means supplied by them, will take over the US war burden.

SUBSTANCE, STAGES AND PURPOSE OF "VIETNAMIZATION"

DEFINING the word "Vietnamization", Secretary of Defense Melvil Laird said on Sept. 26, 1969: "Vietnamization means—a lot more than modernization of the South Vietnamese armed forces to permit their continuing assumption of more military responsibility. Vietnamization means the progressive transfer to the South Vietnamese of responsibility for all aspects of the war and management of their affairs: stronger government, stronger economy, stronger military forces, stronger police for internal security."

(Continued page 2)

South Viet Nam

In the First Week of 1970

PLAF Attacks Stepped Up in Da Nang — Chu Lai Area, Mekong Delta and Western High Plateaux

○ In 3 Days, Over 100 Bases and Positions between Da Nang and Quang Ngai Stormed, 900 Enemy Troops Put out of Action.

○ Cam Zoi Base Overrun, 400 US "Marine" Casualties, Important Enemy Material Losses (6 Jan.).

○ In My Tho Province, a Puppet Company and 300 Soldiers Knocked out of Action; 150 Others Routed in Chau Doc Province.

Processing of azolla pinnata, a green compost, at Hai Anh co-operative, Hai Hau district, Nam Ha province.



NIXON'S "VIETNAMIZATION" POLICY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE

(Continued from page 1)

Thus Vietnamization implies not only a reinforcement of the puppet army into one capable of replacing the US troops, but also and chiefly consolidation of the neo-colonial regime into one capable of subduing the people and drawing from them the resources necessary to keep going the war machine. In fact, since the beginning of last year, the US has set to the equipping and intensive training of the puppet army. Meanwhile, it has been striving to strengthen the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime, with the backing of the military group, stepping up the "accelerated pacification" campaign to clear the areas still under its control, rounding up youths and pre-empting them into the army and leaving new taxes.

Such a program cannot be completed in a short period of time, especially the relief of US troops by the puppet army, without running the risk of altering the relations of forces. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Laird thinks that a "US transitional force" about 250,000 men will remain in South Viet Nam to replace the puppet army till 1971 and will be replaced by a US "residual force" of several thousand American "advisers." These stages being envisaged in the most propitious conditions, there is every prospect of a prolongation of the presence of US forces.

The purpose of that "relief" plan is multiple. In the immediate future, the American rulers want to limit US direct commitment in Viet Nam to keep down American casualties and war expenditures at a level acceptable to the American public. The human and material losses of the US in Viet Nam are at the bottom of its inextricable difficulties.

Inflation, soaring cost of living, social troubles—and the weakening of its position in the world. The anti-war movement in the US has taken such proportions as never seen in the history of that country. To placate popular discontent, the Nixon administration has begun the withdrawal "by dribbles" of US troops and announced a "Vietnamization" plan. At the same time the plan aims at securing at the conference table a "position of strength" from which the US claims to dictate its conditions, otherwise the war will go on. The talks in Paris only serve as a smokescreen for the US to prosecute the war till victory. It is still nurturing the long-term illusion of a military decision.

"Vietnamization" thus means prolongation of the war, pitting Vietnamese against Vietnamese, continu-

ation of the carnage in Viet Nam and sabotage of the Paris Conference.

INSOLUBLE CONTRADICTIONS

THE "Vietnamization" plan of the US is torn by insoluble contradictions.

First, contradiction between the end and the means. In order to maintain by force of arms its neo-colonialist domination while a half-a-million-strong expeditionary force has proved impotent, the US reckons to shift the role to a puppet mercenary army in disintegration. The reinforcement of such an army implies the existence of a viable and efficacious puppet administration while the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique can hardly stand on its legs even with fascist repressive measures against the opposition.

Then, contradiction between the pressing need of de-Americanization and the inevitable slowness of the "Vietnamization" plan. The Nixon administration wishes to rapidly ease the pressure of popular protest against the war. The withdrawal of troops in small doses does not mark as US public opinion insists on the immediate repatriation of American servicemen. Satisfaction of such a demand would jeopardize US military position in the formation and equipping of new puppet units. But the weakness of the Saigon regime and the exigency of the areas under its control do not allow a speedy performance. The announcement of withdrawals—even gradual and partial—of US troops is a hard blow dealt to the morale of the US and puppet soldiers and aggravates the divergences in the enemy ranks, which makes "Vietnamization" more difficult.

THIN HOPES

THE Nixon administration boisterously advertizes the merits and success of its plan. US propaganda extols the raising combativeness of the puppet army and the strengthening of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique while trying to expose the weakness of the Liberation Armed Forces of the PRG. The obduracy of the Nixon administration to pursue its war of aggression is only masked by its craftiness to hoodwink public opinion.

However, all these hopes are vanishing into thin air. Does Mr. Nixon wish in that way to reduce US combat casualties, limit US direct involvement and appease public opinion in the US? The battle-count in 1969—the "Vietnamization" year—can hardly confirm that hope, for that year, US toll in manpower and materials outstripped that of 1968, the

year held by Mr. Nixon as the most disastrous for the US forces in Viet Nam. Nothing shows that the trend can be reversed in the year which has just started. The time will come when the token troop reduction trick will be sealed through unless it is stepped up to the great detriment of US position in South Viet Nam.

Does Mr. Nixon want to gain at all costs a "position of strength" at the Paris negotiations? The failure of US escalation in North Viet Nam and the staggering blows dealt by the 7th 1968 offensive clearly forced the US to the four-party conference on Viet Nam. While the deployment of huge forces and of all the US resources have helped the US get a position of strength, how can it do so by substituting puppet troops for American? The major trump card of this illusory "position of strength" is precisely the US Expeditionary Corps without it, what "position of strength" can Mr. Nixon hope to attain?

The US President wants to snatch a military decision in the long run. But the outcome of the war cannot be decided by some change of circumstances. It depends on essential and permanent factors: the motivation and combativeness of the troops, strategy and tactics, the stability of the rear base... As time goes by, the criminal character of the war of aggression becomes more transparent, which radically undermines the fighting potential of the US troops, whose partial withdrawal embitters the resistance in the ranks of the US and quislings. General Abrams' defensive strategy clashes with the character of the US war of aggression which should essentially be an offensive one. Far from backing the US troops in South Viet Nam, public opinion in the US has been pressing for their immediate repatriation.

On the other hand, the righteousness of the Vietnamese cause mobilizes broader and broader sections of the Southern people for the struggle for independence and freedom and wins stauncher and stancher international support. The Liberation Armed Forces are more and more combat-hardened through the long resistance war and capable of striking at their enemy even in his last refuge. With the formation of the PRG, the free areas in the South have been consolidated; North Viet Nam, the great rear base of the South, leaning on the socialist countries, is keeping up successfully its socialist construction in order to give more effective assistance to the liberation of the South. Nothing confirms Nixon's hope to see the balance of forces tilting in favour of the prolongation of the war.

THE ONLY WAY OUT

LIKE Mr. Johnson's ill-fated "de-Americanization" of the war, Mr. Nixon's "Vietnamization" is doomed to failure. The only possible "de-Americanization" is the total and unconditional withdrawal of all US troops from South Viet Nam. The only sensible "Vietnamization" is to let the Vietnamese people settle themselves.

30th Plenary Session of Paris Conference on Viet Nam (Jan. 18, 1970)

DRVN Envoy Calls for a Realistic Approach to Viet Nam

AT the 30th session of the Paris Conference, Ambassador Ha Van Lau, speaking on behalf of the DRVN Government delegation, laid bare the Nixon administration's systematic and crafty manoeuvres in the past year, aimed at fooling public opinion, covering up its scheme to prolong the war and imposing neo-colonialism on South Viet Nam, thus blocking the progress of the Paris Conference.

President Nixon has been unceasingly protesting his "desire to end the Viet Nam war," he pointed out. But during the past year in office, he did not do anything to stop it but instead dragged it on and even intensified it.

Mr. Ha Van Lau then denounced US continued encroachments upon the sovereignty and threats to the security of the DRVN. In 1969, he said, US aircraft carried out 11,810 reconnaissance flights over North Viet Nam. Against the zone lying between the 17th and 19th parallels, more than 600 bombardments by US tactical planes, were recorded together with 40 bombings by US B-52 strategic planes and nearly 300 shelling by US warships off the coast or by US artillery based South of the demilitarized zone.

In South Viet Nam, the US has been trying to put the "maximum military pressure," carrying out an "accelerated pacification" program, stepping up bombings and toxic chemical sprays.

The US and puppet raiding operations in 1969 doubled those in the previous year. The DRVN envoy dismissed Nixon's peace plan as a "trick" out by means of "Vietnamization" of the war as a plan for war prolongation. He again scored Mr. Nixon's "tricky" troop reduction by dribbles aiming at appeasing public opinion and emphasized that Nixon's "three criteria" for US troop withdrawal were impossible to achieve.

With regard to political problems related to South Viet Nam, Mr. Ha Van Lau commended the US President for the US respects

themselves their own affairs without outside interference, first self-determination of South Viet Nam and then reunification of Viet Nam.

A pointer has been supplied by the ten-point overall solution of the NLF and PRG. Short of that, Mr. Nixon cannot expect to find the light at the end of the tunnel into which he is stubbornly progressing.

HUONG NAM

THE NORTH - GREAT REAR BASE OF THE SOUTH

EXPANSION OF LOCAL INDUSTRY IN NAM HA

NAM HA is a delta province in North Viet Nam with a population of more than 1.6 million. Its main trade is agricultural production. 4 few industrial establishments it had were heavily damaged during the war of resistance against the French. Following the return of peace in 1954, some of these installations were restored and expanded, chiefly to meet the immediate needs of the people in the towns and district centres.

In 1965 when the US escalated its war into North Viet Nam, in implementation of the State policy, Nam Ha started expanding its local industry to serve as the motive force for the building of a strong and steady local economy.

Over the past few years, local industry in Nam Ha, relying on the materials found in the province itself and building on a scale compatible with war-time conditions, has been expanding quickly to all areas including the urban centres, the coastal plains, the mountainous areas and areas specializing in industrial crops or rice growing. Along with

broadening the existing bases, Nam Ha has built new ones. Only in the past four years, in spite of the harsh conditions of war, 18 old establishments have been enlarged and 21 new ones built. Many traditional handicrafts have also been restored and developed. Today, the whole local industry network in Nam Ha can already boast of 58 State-run enterprises and 255 small industry or handicraft co-operatives with a contingent of 90,000 workers and professional or non-specialized craftsmen. This is a many-fold increase compared with the past.

There has been a fairly comprehensive development of the Nam Ha local industry, which now comprises 11 branches. The main ones are mechanical engineering, building materials, textile, food processing and handicraft co-ops. The tempo of development has been even quicker in some of the principal branches: 65.7% for mechanical engineering, 28.3% for the textile industry. The output value of regional industry in 1968 went up by 19.3% compared with the pre-war period and accounted for

while retaining the character as specialized establishments. For instance, there are factories specialized in the production of agricultural machines, and others specialized in the manufacture of farm tools for areas with two rice crops, those with one rice crop (low-lying areas) and those with industrial crops.

Growth rate has been high in both sectors: the State-owned sector and the sector of small industry and handicraft co-ops. Gross output value has also been rising rapidly. In the four years of the US war of destruction, the output value of means of production grew 17.8% and that of consumer goods, 19.6%. The increment was respectively 45.4% and 11.2% for the State-owned industry and small industry and handicraft co-ops. The tempo of development has been even quicker in some of the principal branches: 65.7% for mechanical engineering, 28.3% for the textile industry. The output value of regional industry in 1968 went up by 19.3% compared with the pre-war period and accounted for

about 30% of the total industrial output value of the province. Thanks to improved technique and management, the output value of the whole Nam Ha local industry in 1969 increased by 15.6% over 1968. The rate of growth was from 8.7% to 36.8% for mechanical engineering, timber processing, paper making, pottery, glassware and food processing. In particular, coal production has soared up eight-fold compared with 1968.

The list of industrial products put out by Nam Ha has been lengthening every year. The output value of ever higher quality like agricultural machines and spare parts to equip the mechanical installations in agricultural co-ops, the water pump of the 500 - 1000 cubic metres per hour capacity, the rice-threshing machine of the 4 tons per hour capacity, the animal food grinder, the steel-hulled motor launch, highgrade textile... Preparations are under way for the construction of car bodies and small passenger boats.

Local industry in Nam Ha has been focusing efforts on meeting the increasing needs of agricultural production. The output of industrial goods to be supplied to agriculture has been continually on the upgrade. In 1968, it went up three times compared with the pre-war period.

Every year the province's industrial concerns supply local agriculture with more than 500 agricultural machines of various kinds, and tens of thousands of farm implements of the traditional or improved types. To date, 81% of the agricultural co-ops in the province have been equipped each with a mechanical installation and 56% of them with workshops to repair farm tools. On an average, each farmer in the province had 3.3 hand tools in 1968 (as against 2.2 in 1965). Thanks to this, in many districts, harvesting has been completed a dozen days earlier than formerly. Especially, the farmers have saved hundreds of thousands of workdays for such jobs as irrigating, crop tending, ploughing and harrowing for the purpose of intensive cultivation to raise crop yields.

As a result, the rice output has upped markedly. In 1968, in spite of many difficulties arising out of war aftermaths and weather vagaries, some districts reaped 5 tons or more of paddy per hectare for the whole year. In the current winter-spring 1969 cultivation campaign, the acreage under industrial crops is 5% larger, that of rice 1,000 hectares and the rice output 1.1% higher (per hectare yield

went up by 1.2% over the previous winter-spring crop). The output of spring rice rose to 2.7 tons per hectare in a single crop. Potato productivity doubled and the number of hogs grew by 7.2% compared with the corresponding in 1968. It is safe to say that thanks to the growth of local industry, agricultural production in Nam Ha is developing in a more and more comprehensive manner along the line of high farming. There is every possibility that it will soon reach the three targets set for agriculture throughout North Viet Nam: one man work, five tons of paddy in a year, and two hogs for each hectare of cultivated land.

A part from giving effective assistance to agriculture, the local industry of Nam Ha has also been helpful in the restoration and development of transport and communications. Each year, it has repaired or built thousands of tons of transport means, ten times as much as in 1964. For heavy-duty water transport, it has produced steel-hulled launches and boats, 10-ton wooden boats, etc. It has also repaired or built thousands of tons of hand-carts to the agricultural co-ops and work tools for the building of thousands of kilometres of country lanes to improve continually the network of roads leading from the fields to the warehouse, from the villages to districts and from districts to the province capital.

There has also been a continual increase of consumer goods which accounted for about 60% of the retail sales in the organized market of the province in 1968. The same year saw a rise of four million metres of white cloth, five million metres of coloured cloth, twenty thousand tons of salt and 1.6 million litres of fish or bean sauce over 1967. The total output value of consumer goods went up by 1.5 times compared with the pre-war period.

Remarkably enough, there has been a broad participation of the population in the industrial build-up in the province. Take Nam Ninh district for example. Of the 40 villages in the district, 36 villages already have their own industrial installations. The industrial output value in the district in 1968 made up 47% of the total output of industry and agriculture.

At present, Nam Ha's industry is boosting its activity in a more comprehensive manner in the implementation of the "on-the-spot logistics" guideline in order to meet in an ever fuller measure the needs of production, the fighting and the life of the local population.



Repairing and overhauling pumps at Xuan Phung co-operative, Nam Ninh district, Nam Ha province

LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT's Hanoi Information Bureau Inaugurated

In implementation of an agreement between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and the Laotian Patriotic Front, the Information Bureau of the Laotian Patriotic Front in Hanoi beside the Viet Nam Fatherland Front was officially inaugurated on January 10, 1970.

In his speech delivered on this occasion, Phau Phimphachanh, member of the Central Committee of the LPP and Director of the Information Bureau, pointed out that the setting up of the LPP Information Bureau in Hanoi was a new manifestation of the increasing militant solidarity between the Laotian and Vietnamese peoples and a great encouragement to the Laotian people in the struggle against the US imperialists and their henchmen. He told the guests of the great successes recorded by the Laotian people over the past 25 years under the clear-headed leadership of the LPP headed by Prince Souphanouvong.

He expressed deep gratitude to the peoples of the socialist and nationalist countries and the progressive people the world over for their warm and active support to the Laotian people's just struggle.

After condemning the US imperialists and their ac-

complices—the Vietnamese reactionary ruling circles and Prince Souvanna Phouma, for committing countless crimes in Laos and scheming to turn Laos into a new-type colony and military base, Phau Phimphachanh rejected the slanders levelled by the Laotian reactionaries against the LPP and the DRVN.

He said: "Peace will be restored in Laos if the US imperialists put an end to their interference and aggression in every form, implement the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos and let the Laotians settle their internal affairs under the terms of the 1962-Geneva Agreement and with due consideration for the real situation in Laos, without US interference. First and foremost, the US must halt its bombardments against the clear-headed leadership of the LPP headed by Prince Souphanouvong."

Speaking next, Tran Huu Duyet, Secretary-General of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Central Committee, paid tribute to the achievements of the Laotian revolution.

Despite heavy losses, he said, the US aggressors remain very stubborn and perfidious. They continue encroaching upon the sov-

eighty and security of the DRVN, stepping up their war of aggression in South-Viet Nam, provoking, and conducting sabotage against Cambodia, intensifying and stepping up their special war in Laos to a dangerous level and maintaining a tense situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Facing the US imperialists' manoeuvres, he continued, the Indochinese peoples are determined to strengthen their solidarity, resist and defeat US aggression and preserve their sacred national rights.

The Vietnamese people firmly support the legitimate struggle of the Laotian people, the correct position of the Laotian Patriotic Front which strives for a settlement of the Laotian problem on the basis of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and in conformity with the present concrete situation in Laos. The establishment of the Laotian Patriotic Front's Information Bureau in Hanoi demonstrates the upward trend of the Laotian revolution and is a fine expression of the friendship and mutual encouragement between the two Fronts and peoples. We are convinced that the militant solidarity between Viet Nam and Laos will develop ever more fruitfully, Tran Huu Duyet said.

Meanwhile, guerrillas stepped up their actions everywhere behind enemy lines. In Vientiane, from December 1 to 20, they ambushed the enemy 6 times on the Vietnamese—Nam Ngum road, destroying 6 military vehicles and wiping out many enemy troops. The regional armed forces in Borikhausa overran on December 11 an enemy position in Don village, killing 32 enemy, capturing or forced 5 others to surrender.

News from LAOS

THE LAO SUNG ARE RESOLVED TO PUNISH THE ENEMY

At a recent reception given by Phay Dang Vice President of the CC of the Laotian Patriotic Front, and well-known chief of the Lao Sung, on December 15, 1969 on the occasion of the New Year of that nationality, Prince Souphanouvong called on all the patriotic armed forces and Laotian people, especially the Lao Sung, to step up their attacks against enemy encroaching operations.

On behalf of the CC of the LPP, Prince Souphanouvong congratulated the Lao Sung people on their contribution to the patriotic struggle against US aggression and called on them to punish the enemy for the crimes he had perpetrated in the raids now going on in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang area.

In the name of the Lao Sung people, Phay Dang indignantly denounced the US imperialists and their lackeys' "divide and rule" policy and pressganging of Lao Sung youth in the "special forces" as cannon fodder in the US war of aggression.

LAOTIAN PATRIOTS' EXPLOITS IN DECEMBER 1969

In December 1969, the second month of the dry-season counter-offensive of the Laotian patriotic armed forces, the enemy lost 2,400 troops, 44 military vehicles and hundreds of tons of other war means, announced RPL Agency quoting incomplete reports.

This was biggest monthly loss in lives and war means for the US reactionaries in Laos last year. In the Plain of Jars—Xieng Khouang region, the main battlefield, the patriots put out of action 1,310 enemy troops. They seized or destroyed 8 artillery pieces, wrecked 35 military vehicles, mostly tanks and armoured cars, and 250 tents, and burned tens of thousands of litres of petrol.

In Lower Laos, the patriots pushed up their attacks on Roads 9 and 13, while encircling enemy garrisons in Pakhong, Atpeou, Saravane. As a result, 400 enemy soldiers were knocked out, 45 weapons seized, and 3 military vehicles captured or destroyed by the patriots.

Stepping up the hunt for US-fostered bandits smuggled in the free zone in Upper Laos for sabotage activity, the patriotic armed forces duly punished the enemy in Tongkhou area, Luang Prabang province, and forced over 100 bandits to surrender.

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Chopper of US Airborne Division No 101 downed by guerrillas of Thua Thien province

"CLEAR-AND-HOLD"...

(Continued from page 5)

In the affirmative. Despite the strict application of his tactics of maximum use of fire-power, the PLAF last year increased considerably their offensives. The greater US-puppet losses in manpower and materials, especially in aircraft, vehicles, cannons and vessels, proved that they grew proportionally to the fire-power employed. At times the inefficient use of its fire-power pushed the US to conduct "clearing" operations, but the farther the GIs venture from their bases, the heavier their casualties, as proved by the A Bia battle.

Have the US Succeeded in Bolstering the Puppet Army's Morale?

According to UPI on September 28, 1969, the Saigon puppets' chieftain Nguyen Van Thieu said that "he did not believe the Vietnamese army (puppet-Ed.) could defend the country properly if the US withdrew completely by 1970, leaving behind air force units, artillery and logistic support."

Thieu did not tell the whole truth because the fact is that even now, with the presence of more than 9 US infantry divisions in South Viet Nam, neither American nor puppet troops are able to cope with the PLAF attacks. As for the puppet army, it has taken serious thrashings in Chu Pa (Gia Lai), Ben Het, Bu Prang

strategy is going bankrupt. Nixon and company are trying by hook or by crook to turn the tables, but how can this be possible when they are pinning their hopes on a strategy full of unsolvable contradictions?

The "clear-and-hold" strategy is going bankrupt. Nixon and company are trying by hook or by crook to turn the tables, but how can this be possible when they are pinning their hopes on a strategy full of unsolvable contradictions?

The South Vietnamese armed forces (puppet army-Ed.) will never successfully take over the military burden now carried by the United States.

"It is not hardware or training that is lacking in Saigon's armies. It is will, the one ingredient the United States will never be able to provide. Thieu's soldiers have no heart for this struggle and have not had any for years. Indeed, one of the most striking phenomena of the war is the contrast between the contending forces: a Vietnamese dressed in the peasant garb of the NLF is one of the world's most formidable fighting men; the same man in the uniform of Saigon is one of the world's poorest. Why? Because one believes he fights to drive the foreigner from his soil while the other fights only to sustain the power of a corrupt military clique. Under these circumstances, any hope of simultaneously defeating the NLF and withdrawing US troops has no chance of success.

"If, therefore, a continuing US military presence in Viet Nam will not result in any genuine pacification of a war-weary and embittered countryside, and will not make palatable a government that is not palatable, nor an army fight that has no will to fight, it becomes useless to pursue further a course that is leading nowhere. It is useless to stay on even for the purpose of a bargaining position in Paris, because there is no reason to think that time will serve to strengthen the US position. The only viable option left for the US in Viet Nam is to withdraw at once from the whole tragically misconceived adventure.

(Quang Duc), Ba Ria, Long Khanh on the Xang Keo River in the Mekong Delta, etc. and who is respectable, their losses have been greater at the very places chosen as the key points of the "pacification" plan such as the High Plateaux, Western Nam Bo, Ben Tre and Rach Gia provinces. On the other hand, as reported by AP on December 17, "desertions from the South Viet Nam (puppet-Ed.) armed forces increased this fall despite efforts to solve what officials say is the second most serious problem in Vietnamizing the war... With more than one million men enrolled in the South Viet Nam forces, the rate of desertions per one thousand men adds up to a loss of 10,000 men a month."

The "clear-and-hold" strategy is going bankrupt. Nixon and company are trying by hook or by crook to turn the tables, but how can this be possible when they are pinning their hopes on a strategy full of unsolvable contradictions?

One colonel I overheard when he was presented with his brigade's body count for the day—59 enemy killed—and told that the 3rd brigade only got 40, said: "I don't care which brigade got most—all I care is that I'm killing gooks." This is not GI policy, it is the policy of our officers.

In one of Williams' interviews with a senior US aid official, he was told that 3,000 bodies had been killed by US air strikes in the Chu Lon area after the Tet offensive. When he asked what happened to them, he was told that aid had ordered that they should be bulldozed under the rubble.

When the GIs found several thousand bodies buried in the race track near Saigon, it was announced by our embassy as a "Viet Cong massacre". Roger Williams discovered. "But it was found from prisoner interrogation that these two were victims of American bombing during the reconquest of Saigon and that the NFL forces had buried them, by hand, in carefully dug graves."

Roger Williams touches on a point that all of us know there and which I myself have mentioned: "Our planes, our artillery, our gunships get five hundred a day, so what if my

Further West, between the arms of the Mekong and the Gulf of Thailand, the PLAF were most active in Chau Doc province, chiefly in the Seven Mountains area. They also flattened Rong Co post (Jan 4) and Ba Doi post (Jan 5), sank or burnt 3 vessels on the Vich Te canal dug along the Cambodian border. Furthermore, AFP reported on Jan. 15 that the "special forces" camp at Ba Xoi had been completely looted out by a daytime attack on Jan. 14 and that two American advisors were among the 18 men killed during that PLAF action.

On Jan. 4 and 5 130 casualties on the enemy, grounded 6 choppers and captured 20 members of a "pacification" team.

On the same day, in Saigon, they blew up a US military car, killing all passengers on board.

On the Western bank of the Mekong, about 50 km Southwest of Saigon, regional troops of My Tho province from January 3 to 5 rushed a battalion camp, pounded 5 subsector CPs and intercepted the enemy operating in the region: 300 adverse soldiers, 9 vehicles and 2 cannons put out of

Military Operations

(Continued from page 8)

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Son My...

(Continued from page 4)

left but shattered houses and blown-up gardens, the hamlet was 'pacified'. If people inadvertently stay in such hamlets on a day of incoming fire—they die. If they are found alive in private bunkers, they are killed by US troops who are told that anyone in a bunker is Viet Cong."

"One colonel I overheard when he was presented with his brigade's body count for the day—59 enemy killed—and told that the 3rd brigade only got 40, said: 'I don't care which brigade got most—all I care is that I'm killing gooks.' This is not GI policy, it is the policy of our officers."

In one of Williams' interviews with a senior US aid official, he was told that 3,000 bodies had been killed by US air strikes in the Chu Lon area after the Tet offensive. When he asked what happened to them, he was told that aid had ordered that they should be bulldozed under the rubble.

When the GIs found several thousand bodies buried in the race track near Saigon, it was announced by our embassy as a "Viet Cong massacre". Roger Williams discovered. "But it was found from prisoner interrogation that these two were victims of American bombing during the reconquest of Saigon and that the NFL forces had buried them, by hand, in carefully dug graves."

Roger Williams touches on a point that all of us know there and which I myself have mentioned: "Our planes, our artillery, our gunships get five hundred a day, so what if my

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platoon shoots on a village when we've taken fire from it? What most amazed me is that we would completely destroy the country 'in order to save it, if we deemed it necessary. We have already done half the job. Our policy and our giant machine bases its existence on a systematic program of destruction with artillery, bomber naval guns, gunships, rockets, mortars, tanks and fifty-calibre machine-guns mounted on armored vehicles... We are trying to destroy the Vietnamese revolution, and with it Viet Nam. In a way we are succeeding."

"One major told me personally counted 2,000 bodies after a particularly exhausting engagement. They were bulldozed into heaps and shoved into singlets and taken away by Chinook choppers. 'When you see sight like that,' he said smiling, 'you know we're winning.'"

The main point that I would like to make is that I and all my friends who have been here there object to the idea that Son My was an isolated case. It is standard operating procedure.

TO THE READER

We are aware that there is much room for improvement in the wording of our paper. We apologize for this shortcoming and kindly appreciate all your suggestions as they will help us to serve you more efficiently in future.

ANT-WAR AMERICANS ISSUE STATEMENT

THE American Friends Service Committee has issued a statement baring the Nixon administration's tricks to further their scheme of war continuation in Viet Nam.

The statement, entitled "Viet Nam—Political Illusions and Moral Realities", reads:

"It has been more than a year since the rhetoric of peace began in Viet Nam. During this time scores of thousands of men and women and children have died in the fighting. They continue to die today, and every evidence in Viet Nam is that they will continue to die tomorrow unless there is an unparalleled demand from the American people that the slaughter be halted. While attempting to disarm

public opinion with troop withdrawals, the Nixon administration continues to press the war.

"The US military and government leaders continue to foster illusions in regard to Viet Nam. Americans are under the impression that the war is all but over; it is not. They are being told that the US military policy is one of restraint in the interest of progress in Paris; it is not. They are encouraged to think that the Thieu-Ky government is becoming more acceptable to the Vietnamese and more competent to carry out the war, thus diminishing US-help; it is not."

The statement went on: "If the cruelty of a war is measured by the ratio of civilian to military casual-

ties, the war in Viet Nam may be the cruellest of modern times. Even before the Tet offensive of 1968, it was estimated that there were from 120,000 to 200,000 civilian casualties annually...

"Hundreds of thousands of acres have been defoliated, countless villages have been razed, and bomb craters mark the countryside. In one village, a reasonably stable government, and a reasonably effective Vietnamese army, capable of defending itself against its opponents. The American people are assured that progress toward these goals is being made.

"In fact, pacification efforts have repeatedly failed over a ten-year period, and they will continue to fail. The countryside is less

Americans are assured that US goals in Viet Nam are limited ones. Earlier talk of victory has ceased as the death toll has risen and as the decimation of Viet Nam has become apparent. Today the apologists for continued US military action argue that our commitment will be fulfilled if our forces can achieve a reasonably pacified countryside, a reasonably stable government, and a reasonably effective Vietnamese army, capable of defending itself against its opponents. The American people are assured that progress toward these goals is being made.

"In fact, pacification efforts have repeatedly failed over a ten-year period, and they will continue to fail. The countryside is less

secure in 1969 than it was in 1965, and anti-American feeling has never been as intense as it is now. The Thieu-Ky government does not offer any promise of future stability. The government in Saigon is a military dictatorship propped up by US power, despised by most Vietnamese, and notoriously corrupt. Freedom of speech is suppressed. No one knows exactly how many Vietnamese political prisoners languish in Viet Nam's prison, but the figure is certainly in the thousands, and includes many of the country's leading intellectuals: university professors, religious leaders, lawyers, students, newspaper editors, politicians anyone who has dared to advocate political initiatives to end the war.

Cam Zoi Victory

THE FIRST STAGGERING BLOW
OF THE YEAR AT THE US
AGGRESSORS

In their defence system in the Da Nang Chu Lai sector, the Americans have set up an important base on the formerly woody hill-top of Cam Zoi, about forty kilometres south of Da Nang, near the Son. Called "Base Ross" by the US command, it always served as regimental field CP whenever an important operation took place in that area and was therefore constantly improved and strengthened chiefly since the enemy had been driven into a general defensive position all over South Viet Nam. The great success quickly won by the PLAF on the night of Jan. 5 at Cam Zoi bears a great significance at the beginning of the new year.

First the heavy losses suffered by the enemy elicited punctly testify to the deadly punch of the PLAF, who in a record time killed or wounded nearly 900 GIs, wiped out a battalion CP, 2 infantry companies and an artillery platoon and destroyed a radar station, the signal centre, 9 military vehicles, 2 long-range cannons, about one hundred barracks, casemates and blockhouses, burnt, blew up or seized a big quantity of war materials, ammunition and fuel.

Furthermore, the factor surprise had nothing to do here though the GIs were well taken unawares in their sleep, for it was not the first time that that base was overrun by the PLAF. In the winter of 1967, the first GI (paratroops of the US 101st Division) already suffered a great disaster at Cam Zoi. On Feb. 22 and 27, 1969, the 106th Light Brigade which relieved the American "para" was clobbered on

that hill-top. In the autumn of that year, that brigade was so heavily depleted by PLAF bombardments that it had to be replaced by the First Marine Division, which in its turn licked the dust in a fierce hand-to-hand fight on the night of Jan. 6, 1970.

Besides, the Yankees were well prepared to parry our blows, as shown by the war materials captured at Cam Zoi, which included many electronic apparatuses apparently meant to detect attackers at night.

The successful coup also illustrates the patriotic forces' capability of dealing with all defenses and techniques devised by the aggressors, and rapid progress in combativeness and efficiency, which is rather an ill omen for the US war and "Vietnamization" of the war!

MORE ON SAIGON
WORKER'S GENERAL STRIKE

RIGHT on the morning of January 7, two important communication centres, namely the Tan Son Nhat Airport and the Saigon Port, were virtually paralysed. At the commercial harbour, all loading and unloading operations came to a standstill. At the military harbour, six military 10,000-ton cargo ships filled with war materials were tied down. At Pier 6, 18 other military ships faced the same situation. So did ships at several other piers. Workers at Shell, Caltex and Esso refused to refuel air planes, causing the cancellation of nearly all flights from Tan Son Nhat Air port.

The general strike enlisted the support of large segments of the Saigonese. A statement of support was issued by the Saigon General Association of Students.

NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S
NEW YEAR MESSAGE

ON Jan. 8, 1970, puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu delivered a New Year speech. On Jan. 9, he called a press conference to make public his administration's 1970 programme.

Western agencies reported that Saigon opinion saw

nothing new in his speech compared with the one he had delivered at the end of 1969. What was new was only its "harsher" tone as a result of US Vice-President Agnew's visit to Saigon whose purpose it was to bolster up the tottering Saigon regime.

Nguyen Van Thieu once again reiterated his "de-escalation from a position of strength" argument, rejected all forms of coalition government and opposed a neutralist regime for South Viet Nam. In short, he showed readiness to continue helping his masters pursue their aggressive war against his own people.

He said, "We have first to beef up, consolidate and modernize our regular forces... and expand and strengthen our security forces..." In other words, he would step up the compulsory draft of South Viet-

namese youths who would die in place of American troops, in implementation of the White House's "Vietnamization".

Nguyen Van Thieu implored Nixon not to withdraw all the GIs in 1970: "This (total withdrawal)", he

said "cannot be feasible. It would be unrealistic. Since we have only a limited troop strength, we need time for the training of our men. We need American equipment. We need time to train commanders for our newly formed units". His words betrayed the panic caused by US plans to his US-backed regime.

Interestingly enough, some features of Nixon's tricky plan for troop withdrawals by dribbles were precisely revealed by Nguyen Van Thieu's speech. "In 1970," he said, "a number

GIAI Phong Press Agency last week highlighted the following military actions:

DA NANG — CHU LAI
AREA

FROM Jan. 4 to 6, PLAF men attacked about one hundred enemy bases and positions in the coastal provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh, between the 14th and 16th parallels. The Da Nang airbase and Nuoc Nam near Da Nang helicopter park, a dozen sub-sector CPs, and many points d'appui around Da Nang and Chu Lai, were hit by the patriotic forces. Let's mention the devastating raid on Cam Zoi position, near Que Son, about 40 km south of Da Nang and west-northwest of Chu Lai. PLAF commandos succeeded in storming this Ross Base (American name) and drubbing the GIs Garrisoned there in a hand-to-hand fight despite the numerical inferiority of the PLAF units: 400 US marines of Regiment 7, US Division 1, put out of action. The battalion CP, two infantry companies, an artillery section, the whole radar station and signal centre, were wiped out, 9 military vehicles (5 tanks), 2 175 mm cannons, 10 recoilless guns and heavy machine-guns, about one hundred barracks, blockhouses, and casemates destroyed, many fuel tanks and ammo-

nition dumps and an important booty including electronic detection and infrared apparatuses seized.

North of Quang Ngai, near Soa My, scene of the March 1968 massacre of over 500 civilians by the GIs, another key-post was overrun on the night of Jan. 3; 200 GIs of a battalion CP and an artillery company disabled, 8 heavy guns, many military vehicles and a great quantity of ammunition at Nuoc Nam destroyed.

WESTERN HIGH PLATEAU,
SAIGON REGION
AND MEKONG DELTA

NORTH of the Western High Plateau, from Jan. 5 to 8, the PLAF put out of action at least 200 adverse troops and about 50 vehicles. The major engagement was the ambush of a large report on the Pleiku and Mang Yang pass on Jan. 5: 5 tanks and 23 tank lorries destroyed, 68 GIs killed or wounded.

Southwest of the Plateaux, in many onsets mounted on Jan. 6 in Phu Thien district, the PLAF wrote off the musterrall or decimated a puppet company and three platoons. In Tay Ninh province (about one hundred kilometres northwest of Saigon), the PLAF inflicted

(Continued page 7)

HIRED HOOLIGANS

THE Saigon Senate recently put to discussion a bill along the lines of the Thieu-organized sacking of the Lower House on Dec. 20, 1969. Western agencies reported. It is well-known that this act of hooliganism was an incident which spelled out the dissensions between various factions among US stooges in Saigon. The report said that each of Saigon's wards was ordered by Thieu to contribute to members of the "popular defence" to that violent raid against the Lower House. Each ward received 200 piasters to cover transport expenses whereas each "demonstrator" was paid 100 piasters. The sackers wore black uniforms and were armed with carbins and pistols. They were led by Pho Thai Gia, Chairman of the Saigon City Council.

A Gai Phong Press Agency correspondent in Saigon reported that a number of City Councilors revealed that that body had received from Thieu's wife a cheque of 3 million piasters as reward for the "demonstrators". For a political stunt, Thieu, and took part in the storming of the Lower House on that day.

SITUATION IN SAIGON

US massacre of more than 500 civilians at Son My, which had been universally condemned. He said, "There may be some US individuals who killed some Vietnamese".

Nguyen Van Thieu only revealed himself as a true stooge of the US imperialists, an instrument for the implementation of Nixon's plan to "Vietnamize" the war. The Saigon administration's 1970 programme was indeed another sell-out.

SAIGON LOWER HOUSE
SACKED BY THIEU